To give a hint at what is at stake with these phenomena of consciousness, think of an episodic recollection or of a simple imagination of something as they readily may occur in daily life. Acts of remembering, imagining, depicting something, as well as iterations and combinations of such acts, will serve as examples. In what follows, however, I will concentrate on explicating acts of intuitive ( anschauliche) representification as intentional modifications of perception. To be sure, in his reflective intentional analyses, Husserl also unfolds implications already at the level of presentifying (gegenwärtigende) perceptual acts, for example, in the context of the analysis of time-consciousness and, especially, of the consciousness of inner and outer horizons belonging to every act of consciousness. Footnote 1 I will focus in particular on the crucial discovery of the phenomena of “intentional implication” and/or “intentional modification” which obtain in acts of representification ( Vergegenwärtigung) and in their relations to the basic form of perceptual consciousness. My considerations are mainly an exploration of consciousness as an explanandum in its own right, building on Husserl's reflective-eidetic analyses of consciousness. However, I take a very limited approach to the wide-ranging themes that may come to mind in this context.

In this paper I discuss the question in what ways Husserlian phenomenology as a descriptive science of consciousness has also an explanatory potential in consciousness studies.

A formal notation will be used with the intention to make the reflection-based theoretical language of phenomenology more precise and easier to survey. It will concentrate on explicating acts of intuitive representification ( anschauliche Vergegenwärtigungen) as intentional modifications of perception, making up higher, radical novel levels of intentionality. At the center is an exploration of consciousness as an explanandum in its own right, building on Husserl's reflective-eidetic analyses of conscious experiences. It takes a very limited approach to the wide-ranging themes that may come to mind on this topic. In the context of «reassessing the relationship between explanation and phenomenology», the paper discusses the question in what ways Husserlian phenomenology as a descriptive science of consciousness has an explanatory potential in consciousness studies.

Pronounce eidetic